Golan Naulak
Pre-script: In late 1963, somewhere around the time the world gasped at the news of President John F Kennedy’s assassination, a meeting took place in Pakistan that was to change the fate of the Zo people living in the border areas of India and Burma. One of their leaders Tunkhopum Baite went to Rawalpindi in Pakistan to meet General Ayub Khan who was the President at that time. During the meeting, which was fruitful and promising to both parties, General Ayub Khan referred to Tunkhopum Baite as ‘General’- a prefix he carried thenceforth. Apart from that, Gen. Ayub Khan also gifted him a Rolex watch which has a compass in it and another one of Citizen make. The journey of this Rolex watch presents an interesting insight into the insurgency movement in the then Lushai Hills and the political outcomes thereof.
The northeastern states of India falls under what Prof. Wilhem van Schendel coins as “Zomia”- the upland massif starting from the highlands of South east Asia and extending till this region. This landmass is what James Scott beautifully captures in his book ‘The Art of Not Being Governed’, where he described it is an area of stateless people. However, this statelessness is, as Scott argues, not a condition of helplessness or lack of something. It is rather a political choice, of these hill peoples, to avoid the institutions and practices of valley or plain state-making. That, is now history. The story of how these people who seemed to tactfully avoid state-making for a long period embraced state formations in the twentieth century is a fascinating one. It produced contested histories, overlapping maps and politics of nomenclature among other developments.
In this part of the world, politics of identity has dominated the public discourse. Questions of who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we headed to? has been raised time and again. It led to the eruptions of several political movements and mobilisation along ethnic lines. In this, the region turned out to be a welcoming stage for the theatre of conflict, dilemma and violence.
The search for identity came with the demand for statehood or nationhood for most movements. The micro-history of the Zo people, clamouring for unity under different nomenclatures and as many political and insurgency movements is a testimony to the complexity arising out the arrival of modern state formation into their region. It is a reminder of the difficulties experienced by a people during this transition from primordial ways of identification and belonging and the new sense of identity and likewise, belongingness that the modern life under the influence of the state seems to offer.
In this context, the life and work of Tunkhopum Baite allows us to re-read history of post-Independent India. It offers to its readers a fresh and invigorating look into the possibilities of identity formation and political visions among the Zo people. It is a reminder of history being written by the victors; never by its victims. Therefore, it is important to situate Baite and his Chin Army into our common consciousness so as to enable a better understanding of our people and our struggles. This is an extremely crucial aspect keeping in mind the existence of almost similar movements in our society today. Moreover, lack of knowledge about our own history has sometimes relegated leaders like Tunkhopum Baite to a folktale-like figure, almost mythical. While our movements are basically movements for identity consolidation, there are also several dimensions to it not directly asscociated to the primary goal.
On Identity
As much as India still struggles to consolidate her identity, communities on her eastern frontiers continue to scramble for whatever is left to them after the Partition of 1947. Such is the impact of colonial legacy. The Zo people, described as Chin, Kuki, Mizo and Zomi are no exception to the victimization of border-mapping. Divided by the international borders of India, Myanmar and Bangladesh and state borders too, they have seen initiatives of various kinds in an attempt to unite them all together. Yet, their dream is still unrealised even today. Rather, such movements seem to be heading in a different direction under pragmatic economic and political compulsions.
Among the many such movements within the Zo fold, perhaps one of the pioneer and ambitious one was that of the Chin Army founded by Tunkhopum Baite on 23rd December 1962. It was the first known armed movement in the name of the Zo people independent India. Maybe it was the period that had its sway. Former colonies were gaining independence from their colonial masters and the mood was that it was the right time to fight for independence. The Chin Army was only following the demand put forth by the Paite National Council (PNC) to the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1960 under the title “Re-unification of Chin People’ in which they listed thirty odd tribes.
What is important to note in this politics of nomenclature, that is, the politics of Zomi, Kuki, Mizo or Chin is that these modes of identifications are modern constructs. It will do us good to remember that identities are not static concepts. They undergo change as much as the people who constitute them. Likewise, the markers of our identification should be seen as flexible enough to accommodate the demands and necessities of our times. The unwillingness to accommodate has only divided us and led to several political and armed movements representing the same people, same geographical area and with the same goal. Such is the tragedy of our existence and politics. Shakespeare once said ‘What’s in a name?’ If he were alive to see the history of Zo politics, he would’ve changed his mind. Or rather, we would be telling him ‘The name is everything’. We, Zo people, have been a witness to the importance of naming. We know it so well that today we still swear and fight by it.
Likewise, the Chin Reunification- Chin Liberation Army, commonly known as Chin Army, led by Baite was one such testimony to our politics of nomenclature. But it is more than just that. It was an attempt to form an independent political entity for all the Zo people. Its vision was inclusive of all the Zo people unlike many of its counterparts.
One must remember that this category of identification led us to our narrow ideas of nationalism. What came to be known as Kuki nationalism, Mizo nationalism, Chin nationalism or Zomi nationalism is premised on the belief that we are different and unique from others. It is ethinic-nationalism. The Zo people perhaps today can do better if we can foster the idea of nationalism that is more focused on cultural capital. Cross-border integration both international and intra-national seems an unlikely political possibility.
Realpolitik suggests that the state we are in now, the divided family, the disconnect, the utopia of unification will continue to be the reality of our existence. The Nagas’ attempt for a Greater Nagaland or Nagalim isn’t making much head way. The Meiteis rose up in protest at the very mention of territorial breakaway. Hence, the subsequent demand for an Alternative Agrement (AA) for the Nagas in Manipur.
This is where I personally believe that we have much work to do even if we keep aside our dreams of territorial integration. If, and this is an optimist ‘if’, we can reach out to one another, share our experiences of living under different states and political units, visit one another, help and learn from one another, it will pave the way for a consciousness that is shared, a culture that is shared, common history and a common vision. But if we continue to choose to live under the illusion of fragmented ethno-nationalisms as we do today, in no time we will be against one another as we already are. We will be fed to the demands of the benevolence of a state system that survives on dividing people, and also to other exposures such as environmental degradation and corporate loot. And this is a possibility only if we concede our egoistic attachment to names of our own liking, if we understand that identities are fluid, multiple and can be shared. For this, we need to move away from our binary practices of being either Zomi or Kuki, or Zomi or Mizo, Chin or Zomi. I can very well be a Zomi, Chin, Kuki or Mizo at the same time. Today, I share the same joy when Mary Kom wins the Olympic bronze medal as much as when Van Dawt Cin (Moe Moe) won the second place in Burma’s talent hunt show Melody World or when I came to know that James Keivom works for New York Times. Because I belong to them, they belong to me.
Reflections on the Chin Army: Its rise and demise
In our pursuit of a common platform where all the Zo people can stand as one entity, the Chin Army stands out for various reasons. It provides much in terms of what we can learn from the its founder, its leaders and organizational structure, its collaborators and foes too. The history of the Chin Army is a window into the travails of our Zo unification movement. This is a sensitive narrative for our present mainly because it is a challenge to our common perception of how a community or nation should be constituted. Yet it is a story that has to be told and understood in the best interest of our movements today.
One of the most important lessons one might learn from Tunkhopum Baite and the Chin Army is on the question of leadership. Questions related to this includes whether he was an able leader, competent enough to lead and achieve his mission. While most of his colleagues and his contemporaries seem to accuse him of being too single-headed, distrustful even of his closest aides and lacked confidence in others, there are several evidences that suggests otherwise. Also, the reasons why he took much of the decisions alone and without consulting his juniors or aides was the absence of comrades to whom he could confide in. There are lessons we can learn from his successes and mistakes. What makes a movement strong does not depend only on its leader. Baite was an incumbent. He had leadership skills right from his school days. He was forthcoming too. A movement also depends on the followers, its organizational structure, discipline and most importantly, public support.
Many of his aides mentioned the lack of educated fellowmen who could share ideas with Baite. The sense was that the educated one those days were either too scared to devote themselves to the Zo unification movement or only wanted to pursue their dreams of a better life for themselves. This resulted in a lonesome Baite with no one competent enough to guide and advice him. Another point they all seemed to agree on is the utter poverty of our people. This led to the feeling that our low income levels is partly a reason for the public’s inability to support the movement in terms of finance. Also, the Mizos were seen as more prosperous and more in number hence the reason for their success.
The Chin Army included members from different tribes under the Zo fold. Members spoke in different tongues other than Tedim Chin or Paite which were the dominant dialects used by the members. Pi Nemthang recounts the arrival of several members using Thadou and Baite dialects at her home in Teikhang.
Tunkhopum Baite’s death is still shrouded in mystery. It has also come to occupy a bitter component in the relationship between Mizo/Luseis and Zomi-Chin/Paites in later period. For those who are aware, it also raised suspicion between Paites and Kukis due to the role played by Kuki National Army (KNA-UK) under Demkhosiek. In fact, there has been a rivalry between Baite and Thangkhopao Kipgen even during Hill Union days in Imphal when Baite was the President. Furthermore, much later, in a shady attempt to sabotage the movement spearheaded by PNC, Rishang Keishing and Thangkhopao Kipgen filed a court case against PNC leaders accusing them of planning secessionist activities. Such events marked a scar in the fragile relationship between fellow tribals causing much disunity among them.
In many ways, like I mentioned earlier, when we look back at the Chin Army and its objectives, the tactics they employed and vision it claims to pursue, it appears that the movement is not a viable one - that Zo unification is not a possibility. This opinion was voiced by both Indian home minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on his visit to Imphal in 1961 and prime minister Pandit Nehru when the PNC leaders went to submit their memorandum in 1963. While Shastri told a delegation which included Baite that they will not succeed in their mission of Chin unification and extolled them to study hard and get plump jobs within the Indian state, Nehru was more diplomatic when he said, ‘A time will come when all nations will unite together.’
How far have we come about to adopt the point made by Shastri is worth introspecting. Looking at all indices, the possibility of Zo unification might appear bleak. This is to say, if we consider the political viability, economic constraints, etc one would, without any hesitation, agree that this mission is utopian. If we choose to live our lives pursuing plush jobs within our respective states it is entirely our choice. But if we choose to continue our belief that Zo unification is possible, it will be. At the end, it all depends on the Zo people whether they want to live under one single political administrative unit or they are prefer living in their present settings and trying to enhance their livelihoods. It is our calling. It is not for India or Burma to decide.
Even as the death of Baite continues to be shrouded in mystery, the more important message is his deed and not his death. Inspite of acknowledging this fact, it remains to be seen how his demise wil play a role in the Zo unification project. Chances are that his death will be a thorn in this but there are also chances that his death be made a symbol of reconciliation, a realisation of our follies. The political vision of Baite conflicted with that of Laldenga, the leader of the Mizo National Front (MNF). Whereas it remains unclear about the objective of the KNA-UK in their advocacy to eliminate Baite, the enmity with the Mizos and Laldenga was quite evident. At the personal level, perhaps Laldenga saw Baite as a rival. Starting from his inability to get an audience with General Ayub Khan while Baite could, Laldenga could have developed a certain degree of insecurity in relation to the Chin Army. Having to train under the name of Chin Army and shouting ‘Chin Army’ slogans at their training camp in Bangladesh, there is every likeliness of him seeing Baite as an obstacle to achieve his goal of forming an independent Mizoram.
But more convincing is the argument that it was basically the clash of political visions that resulted in their drift. Laldenga was clear of his demand: to be united with Mizo as the name, Aizawl as the capital and the territory to comprise of the then Lushai Hills. On the other hand, Baite had a very different political goal: to unite all Chin people into one single political unit. He was not clear what name they would adopt, what should the capital be. He even went a step further. Perhaps it is possible that it was under the influence of General Ayub Khan who asked Baite to unite the Chin people and even the whole of Northeast India to fight the Indian state. The larger political goal Baite envisioned in this regard was what he called BRACHIN, which is short for Brahmaputra-Chindwin. The idea was that all the several communities living between these two great rivers would unite under one umbrella and demand independence.
This was remarkable of Baite – for someone who grew up in a small, remote village in southern Manipur to be able to imagine in a political idea that encompasses not just his community but other and even unfamiliar communities. It was an idea that was always there, that the people in this region share a certain degree of uniqueness, common culture and traditions that sets them apartfrom both India and Burma. It was this idea that gave inspiration to forums like the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Froce (IBRF) which is a conglomerate of various insurgent groups operating in the northeast. The ideas of Baite, with respect to the integration of all peoples living in this geographical space between the Brahmaputra in India and Chindwin In Burma, is worth revisiting today. It defies narrow and tribal political affiliations. It takes into account the diversity of the region, and hence its complexity.
Baite had to face two central problems in the movement he led. First, the relationship with PNC. Without the support of PNC, the public found it difficult to support his activities. Although they guaranteed support in the beginning and shared the idea of Zo unification, PNC later found it increasingly impossible him because Baite adopted an armed struggle. PNC was an overground organization and therefore could not voice its official support to the Chin Army. Yet, the leaders played their part in their capacity as individual advocates of the movement. His untimely death also led to confusion among the public. The PNC leadership is supposed to have sent a note to the Nagas not to entertain a band of young men who went to follow Baite’s footsteps and continue the relationship he started. How far this is true is difficult to be ascertained though.
Second, the relationship with the MNF under Laldenga constitutes the most important one. What began as an alliance to undergo training together under the name of Chin Army in East Pakistan, soon had a fall out due to ideological differences and practical political compulsions. The Saitual Agreement signed between Baite and Laldenga wherein it was agreed that they would cooperate and help one another in times of need; that the Chin Army was to control the Sialkaltang range in north-east Mizoram while the rest of Mizoram was to be under the MNF. It was based on this understanding that Laldenga could visit Lamka and Baite could travel through Mizoram on his visits to East Pakistan. Later, as we have seen in the earlier pages of this book, according to Holkhotong Baite, it was most likely that Tunkhopum Baite was waylaid and taken prisoner on his return from East Pakistan somewhere between Selaam and Zoutaang by cadres of both MNF and KNA-UK.
This act signifies the betrayal of promise and also the design of power politics. On this particular incident, many people opined that Baite was being naïve and unsuspecting. What he wanted was to work with MNF for an independent Chinland and government. Even after he was acutely aware of the plan of MNF, he failed to take into account the vulnerability of his own life and his army. He carried with him the belief that Laldenga would be an ally in their fight for Zo unity. He was a dreamer, a visionary but perhaps not the shrewd and skilled player that our movement desperate required.
The history of Chin Army also allows us to bring to light the long standing political traditions among different communities in the region. We see that relationships with the KNA and MNF had turned sour. Contacts with the Nagas under Naga National Council (NNC) at that time was always a welcome step. In fact, Nagas had agreed to help both C-in-C Sonkhopau Suantak and even PC Parte. It was only the intra-group fighting and differences that could not materialise this proposed alliance. This tells us how histories are produced with certain noticeable practices. Even today, we find it extremely difficult to break the suspicion and sense of betrayal which got produced as a result of this history. It remains, to some extent, at the core of our inability to come anywhere close to Zo unity. It remains for us to choose whether we want to be prisoners of a particular history and continue our helpless, senseless divisons or whether we are serious of making history together that take us one step closer to the dreams of our fathers. It is a choice we must take. And it is our choices alone that determines our future.
Conclusion
Today, we face several dilemmas as a community. Most of us seem to be taking the road of pessimism. Hope is a distant virtue. The majority of us, I believe, are going through a phase where we tell ourselves that nothing good or constructive can come to this land. We are beguiled by the charms of fast money and instant personal gratifications. As a community, we see almost no point in introspection and deliberation. We think they are a waste of time. It is in such times as ours that we need to remind ourselves of the possibilities we have before us. We ought to tell one another that we can carry forward the dreams of nation building alongside our commitment to fulfilling requirements like getting a job or building a house. This can happen only if we re-read our history and imagine the future. By not harping on missed chances and past betrayals, we can let our stories intermingle and create a platform for all of us.
Tunkhopum Baite’s vision deserves a place in the conversation of our politics. Though the Chin Army was a movement cut short of its goal, one must realise that it was a young movement. By the time Baite left on his last trip to East Pakistan, he had already laid down plans for his return, and even delegated work for each member. He had his limitations but he was working on them and was on his way of building an enduring organization.
As we continue in our search for a political answer to our problems, we are increasingly confronted with new ones. We have movements demanding political status from the Indian state and recognition from the international community. At the same time, there is a growing sense among the youth that our political struggles will not take us anywhere. There is a certain degree of disillusionment with our movements. What they are preoccupied with is to how fast they can fit into the world stage. Like everyone else, we want development with the preservation of our traditions and culture. This is a tricky balance we need to navigate.
The recognition of the this fact, which is the importance of our economic survival, hopefully will make us realise that the political solution will always be in the back of our mind – not to be abandoned or sold out. Laldenga compromised his demand for independence to statehood. Muivah, Isak and Khaplang never accepted such watered down proposals from the Indian government. Hence, the Nagas have a much bargaining power than the Mizos today. Moreover, they are in a position to come up with new categories and arrangements outside the existing practices. We need to realise the importance of a sustained political movement. The importance of multiple voices within our movement should be taken more seriously. The voices of women bodies, the churches, elders, and concerned individuals should be given more weightage. Our society should not become an altar of sacrifices in the name of nationalism of one kind.
In recent times, with the news about the construction of mega dams and mining projects coming up in our areas, there is an urgent need to assess our stand and voice. Certainly we can’t be mute spectators to this the unfolding of this. Add to that the entering of the technology and market economy, if we can only risk being engulfed if we don’t take a reasoned stand.
It is in this light that I hope Tunkhopum Baite becomes an exemplary figure. He was hard-working and dedicated. He believed in ideas larger than the pulls and constraints imposed by the reality of his times. He dared to dream big. He created alliances both within our communities and with the outside world. His first love was always his people and their land. However, this love did not result into the hating of any other community. This is an example we ought to carry with us as we march forward in our task. Ultimately, our supposed enemies will be our neighbours tomorrow. We can’t afford to live without them.
Post-script: The Rolex watch of Tunkhopum Baite along with his Citizen watch were the only two items they found on him when was taken a prisoner by the MNF in January 1967. This watch was perhaps one of his most prized possessions and useful one because it had a compass in it. Unsurprisingly, the Rolex was taken by Laldenga on his arrest while the Citizen watch went to Adjutant General R Sangkawia. The story that it had fallen off in one of their encounters with the Indian Army and how the MNF President’s men went searching for it is a telling one. It was not lost forever, as C Vanlalrawna explains. It was to be in the hands of Laldenga from that time. We did not hear about the watch anymore. We are unsure whatever happened to it. The journey of this Rolex is much like the idea of nationalism that came to us from the outside world. That we choose to nationalism as the main marker of our identification was injected by General Ayub Khan who gave the watch to Tunkhopum Biate. As long as it was with him, the Chin Army was the driver of the Zo movement and Baite was its compass. With his arrest and murder, the light or vice of nationalism fell on Laldenga who took the Rolex for himself. From that day, he took the helm of Zo nationalism. It is a tragedy that his idea could not accommodate most of us. But he was the compass. Time was on his side. Today, as much as we are uncertain what happened to the watch, we are in a confused state to our ideas of nationalism. Most of us are unconvinced it is heading anywhere. Bottom line is as the watch was a modern European product, so is our idea of nationalism. The watch came to our hills from the Pakistanis, likewise our nationalistic movements gained momentum from their support and patronage. This calls for a re-imagining of our Zo people and their land. We can delve on identities that are not necessarily exclusive, that are plural, diverse and accommodating. This should be our new goal for which we will require some break with our existing beliefs. We will require to base our movements not only on accounts of colonial historians and ethnographers. There is an urgent need to go beyond such attachments. A serious exploration into our cultural capital, indigenous practices and techniques is inevitable. C Vanlalrema’s Northern Star has fallen. We need a new Northern Star to lead us.
